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1. Introduction 
 
Despite the importance to shareholders of companies being able to grow without resorting to 
acquisitions (Favaro et al., 2012) examination of the sales function forms a relatively small and 
declining body of literature (Plouffe et al., 2008; Avlonitis & Panagopoulos, 2010). In particular, the 
role of outsourcing in the sales function is overlooked (Anderson et al., 2003; Rapp, 2009). Only a 
handful of empirical studies since 1985 specifically address sales outsourcing (Anderson, 1985; 
Wilson & Zhang, 2002; Krafft et al., 2004; Unal & Donthu, 2014). These previous studies have  
examined “all or nothing” sales outsourcing in limited contexts from a particular theoretical lens. It 
has been observed that the sales function largely escaped the trend towards outsourcing in the 
1990s (Anderson et al., 2003). Moreover, sales outsourcing has not been addressed previously by an 
in-depth qualitative cross-sectoral study. 
 
Against this backdrop, this study explores the perceptions of senior sales managers (an ultra- elite as 
defined by  Zuckerman (1972)) regarding the factors that influence make-or-buy in their resourcing 
decisions. This is a contribution to the call for more research on the sales function (Marshall & 
Michaels, 2001; Plouffe et al., 2008; Mantrala et al., 2010). This study explores the factors that 
influence  resourcing choices based on propositions derived from three theoretical perspectives, 
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namely transaction cost economics  (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975), the resource-based view 
(Wernerfelt, 1984) and the real options theory (Sanchez, 1993). The extant outsourcing literature 
indicates a number of moderators that affect the relationship between factors that influence the 
make-or-buy decisions and final decisions to make-or-buy. These moderators have not yet been 
consolidated into a single “make-or-buy” study of sales (Anderson, 1985; Anderson et al., 2003).  
Therefore, to fill this gap, this study also seeks to explore factors that moderate outsourcing 
behaviour.  
 
From a theoretical perspective, these findings will make a contribution to outsourcing theory by 
examining it in the context of a customer-facing function where outsourcing is relatively under-used. 
The sales function is one where wholesale outsourcing of the function is rare, even though 
companies might outsource all of their logistics or facilities management. The granular use of 
outsourcing (out-tasking) (Krishnamurthy et al., 2009) which appears to be the normal approach in 
sales outsourcing (Rogers, 2008), enables a rich discussion about make-or-buy. Furthermore, it is 
expected that the findings of the present study will make a contribution to practice by offering sales 
managers some preliminary propositions for decision-making which can support the optimisation of 
resourcing options. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
Outsourcing can be used to create value and drive innovation (Lacity & Willcocks, 2014). In the sales 
function, the use of sales agents (also known as manufacturers’ representatives and contract sales 
organisations) in market entry is one of the most long-standing applications (Anderson & Coughlan, 
1987; Peng et al., 2006). Product launches are also a time when additional flexible sales resource is 
required (Anderson & Trinkle, 2005; Rogers, 2008). The impact of using contract sales organisations 
in on-going customer relationships has been briefly explored (Palmatier et al., 2007). Strategic 
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challenges such as making marketing plans work (Bonoma, 1984), improving the supply chain 
(Christopher & Ryals, 1999; Wong et al., 1999), and internal change management (Colletti & Chonko, 
1997), invite the consideration of sales outsourcing, but it is an option rarely studied in depth 
(Dishman, 1996; Rogers, 2008; Rapp, 2009).  
 
Several economic and strategic theories have been applied to aspects of outsourcing (Busi & McIvor, 
2008). Transaction cost economics is most frequently applied (Murphy et al., 2012; Mugurusi & de 
Boer, 2013). TCE is the theoretical lens applied in seminal works on sales outsourcing (Anderson, 
1985; Krafft et al., 2004). Krafft et al. (2004) compared TCE with agency theory, noting similarities in 
predictors, and finding that factors solely associated with agency theory were not influential in the 
make-or-buy decision in sales.  Resource advantage theory has been used in Unal & Donthu (2014) 
and resource-based view was considered alongside TCE in Wilson and Zhang (2002). Arguably, there 
are similar predictors in RBV, core competency theory (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990); industrial 
economics (Porter, 1985) and strategic management (Quinn & Hillmer, 1994), i.e. that valuable, 
differentiating competences will be in-sourced. TCE and resource based view (RBV) have been 
combined in seminal works on outsourcing decision models (Arnold, 2000; Verwaal et al., 2008; 
McIvor, 2009; Neves et al., 2014).   
 
Given the introduction of flexibility as a motivation for sales outsourcing in Rogers (2009) and 
findings supportive of real options in the case of international market entry (Brouthers et al., 2008) 
and customer relationship management (Graf et al., 2013), this lesser-used theoretical lens might 
also be useful in an exploratory study of make-or-buy in sales, especially given the weakness of TCE’s 
predictive power regarding business uncertainty (Carter & Hodgson, 2006, Lacity et al., 2011), 
specifically in sales outsourcing (Anderson, 1985; Krafft et al., 2004).  
 
4 
 
Convincing arguments for combining TCE, the RBV and real options (RO) theory in the case of 
outsourcing and optimising organisational design have been made by Foss (1998) and Leiblein 
(2003). It can be insightful to explore the different perspectives that managers use in their decision 
making (Reuer et al., 2011). Hätönen and Eriksson (2009), reviewing 30 years of outsourcing 
literature, argue that there are three core reasons to outsource: for cost-savings, for capability 
enhancement and for process improvements to gain flexibility. Therefore, this combination of 
theories should enable the broadest possible exploration of the motivations of senior sales 
managers in make-or-buy decisions. 
 
2.1 Transaction cost economics (TCE) 
 
Although highly likely to be a primary consideration in practice, production cost comparisons are 
treated fairly briefly in most outsourcing theory. Tangible cost differences are still a dominant factor 
in the 21st century business case for particular types of organisational structure (Fan, 2000). 
Notably, cost leaders in markets have a higher outsourcing intensity (Martinez-Sánchez et al., 2007). 
There is empirical support for the dominance of cost/price considerations in motivating outsourcing 
of activities (Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2002; Kremic et al., 2006). The escalating cost of selling has 
been highlighted as a reason for firms to consider outsourcing (Anderson et al., 2003). Sales 
managers expect contracting out to cost less than the employment of salespeople, even if they have 
another primary motivation for it (Rogers, 2009). Cost/price comparisons are likely to be made when 
outsourcing sales activities, and are highly likely to be part of the on-going measurement of success 
(Spriggs, 1994).  
 
Transaction cost economics has been positioned both as an alternative to production cost 
comparison and as a supplement to it; of particular interest in this study is the possibility that 
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transaction costs may be a subsequent consideration (Williamson & Ghani, 2012), and therefore a 
moderating factor. 
 
Transaction costs are the costs of governance which is a source of what practitioners might label 
“hidden costs” (Barthélemy, 2001). The principles of transaction cost economics require the cost of 
controlling resources post-contract to be considered.  In meta-analyses of empirical studies 
(Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997; David & Han, 2004; Geyskens et al., 2006), transaction cost theory has 
convincing support.  
 
Many key studies of sales outsourcing or vertical integration of channels (Anderson, 1985; Brettel et 
al., 2011; Dutta et al., 1995; John & Weitz, 1988; Krafft et al., 2004; Majumdar & Ramaswamy, 1994; 
Rangan et al., 1993; Shervani et al., 2007; Unal & Donthu, 2014) have examined the “make-or-buy” 
decision in sales from a transaction cost point of view and concluded that where transaction costs 
exist, sales will be insourced.  Anderson (1985), whose work has been acknowledged by Williamson 
and Ghani (2012) as most influential in applying TCE to marketing issues, found that the strongest 
effect in predicting internal or outsourced salesforce is difficulty in evaluating performance, 
associated in TCE with “behavioural uncertainty”. This was reinforced by Krafft et al. in 2004; it was 
also the strongest indicator of vertical integration of channels in a large sample, cross-industry study 
by Majumdar and Ramaswamy (1994). 
 
However, there are nuances which qualify this strong theme. Some third party salespeople do 
identify with the brands they represent and work harder for the brands with which they feel the 
strongest link (Hughes & Ahearne, 2010). Also, within organisations, sales employees’ goals may be 
only partly congruent with their employer (Jelinek & Ahearne, 2006).  Therefore, the relationship 
between the costs of behavioural control and insourcing requires deeper exploration. Thus, it is 
proposed that: 
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P1: Comparative cost of resource options will be a primary factor in “make-or-buy” decisions in the 
sales function. 
P2: The ease with which resource options can be controlled will be a primary factor in “make-or-buy” 
decisions in the sales function. 
 
2.2 Resource based view (RBV) 
 
Another strong theme in TCE is that vertical integration is needed to leverage specific assets, but 
Williamson (2002) conceded that organisational knowledge and learning are dealt with in only a 
limited way by TCE. Carter and Hodgson (2006) recommended that human asset specificity should 
be a separate construct, aligned with competency. Skill has been described as the only thing that is 
specific about salespeople (Anderson, 1985). Skills are recognised as rent generators in the resource-
based view (Newbert, 2008), and some sales skills have particular value (Menguc & Barker, 2005). 
The RBV focuses on the role of specialised capabilities as a source of value creation for firms 
(Wernerfelt, 1984; Grant, 1991). Although the view that capability is something beyond asset 
specificity is held strongly (Barney, 1999), the asset specificity argument within TCE has been aligned 
with competency (Argyres &  Zenger, 2007) and this was a conclusion in one study of sales 
outsourcing  (Wilson & Zhang, 2002). It is probable that the comparative skill level of resource 
options is a factor in “make-or-buy” decisions in the sales function.  
 
If the resources a company utilises in a specific activity are unique, the less likely it is to be 
outsourced (Espíno-Rodriguez & Padrón-Robaina, 2006). Some studies have focused on the 
importance of which skills must be kept within the firm to defend its differentiation (Watjatrakul & 
Drennan, 2005; Safizadeh et al., 2008), since workers with very specific skills can be mobile (Battu et 
al., 2002). Although many firms access what they perceive to be specialist and focused selling skills 
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from third parties (Novick, 2000; Weinrauch et al., 2001), it is the firm-specific skills of salespeople 
that accrue highest value (e.g. Galunic &Anderson, 2000).  These skills may be associated with 
knowledge of the nature of the company, its products and customers (Krafft et al., 2004), or they 
may be more specific to the individual’s relationships within the firm (Menguc & Barker, 2005).  
 
Previous studies from TCE and RBV viewpoints have identified specificities or competences that 
seem to restrict a firm’s likelihood to outsource. These include company nature (Anderson, 1985), 
collective learning (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990), organisational identity (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2005), 
firm characteristics (Oh, 2005) and strategic orientation (Rapp, 2009). Relevant studies have tested 
the length of time that a salesperson would need to get to know “the way we do things” as an 
indicator of the relevance of brand ambassadorship in a salesperson’s skill set. The complexity of the 
product/service portfolio is also an indicator of skills/knowledge value (Anderson, 1985; Wilson & 
Zhang, 2002; Krafft et al., 2004). The degree to which organisations value customer relationships is a 
factor which has a particular resonance for the outsourcing or otherwise of customer-facing 
activities. The major studies of sales outsourcing found that knowledge of customers and 
relationship-building ability are strongly associated with sales insourcing (Anderson & Schmittlein, 
1984; Anderson, 1985; Wilson & Zhang, 2002; Krafft et al., 2004).  
 
Furthermore, studies of manufacturers’ representatives/sales agents and employed salespeople 
have acknowledged the value of integrating sales activity with the rest of the organisation, 
sometimes identified as team selling (Jackson et al., 1999; Tellefsen & Eyuboglu, 2002). Menguc and 
Barker (2005) found that the collaborative skills of the salesperson within his/her own company was 
the most significant and direct relationship with sales performance. Therefore, it is interesting to 
pursue this aspect of sales skills, especially as Williamson (1979) posited that most skills are 
transferable apart from inside knowledge and team dynamics. This aspect of a salesperson’s skills 
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has attracted theoretical comment (Wilson & Millman, 2003; Plouffe & Barclay, 2007) and some 
empirical support (Liu & Leach, 2001; Tellefsen & Eyuboglu, 2002).  
 
Nevertheless, knowledge-based activities are being outsourced (Sen & Shiel, 2006) and contract 
sales organisations are involved in team selling (Jackson et al., 1999). These exceptions are worthy of 
exploration alongside the organisational form that RBV predicts. Additionally, the utilisation of 
external skills to develop future capabilities (Ansoff, 1957) warrants consideration.  Thus, it is 
proposed that: 
 
P3: The comparative skill level of resource options will be a primary factor in “make-or-buy” decisions 
in the sales function. 
 
2.3 Real options theory 
 
TCE assumes that in an uncertain business environment, activities should be insourced. From a 
practitioner view, outsourcing and particularly offshoring, can increase risk and constrain agility 
(Downey, 1995; Whitmore, 2006). Klein et al. (1990) find support for this view in a study of export 
markets and Stapleton and Hanna (2002) find support for it in the shipping industry. There is also 
contrary evidence. Qualitative studies (Schuster & Keith, 1993; King, 2006; Rogers, 2009), a 
modelling study (Alvarez & Stenbacka, 2007) and quantitative studies (Schilling & Steensma, 2002; 
Miranda & Kim, 2006; Díez-Vial, 2007; Martinez-Sánchez et al., 2007; Li et al., 2010) suggest that an 
uncertain business environment will prompt companies to outsource more activities to reduce risk. 
 
Real options theory has been considered complementary to the RBV and TCE (Foss, 1998; Lieblein & 
Miller, 2003). “Real options” brings a “dynamic dimension” to theories of the firm (Foss, 1998, p. 2). 
Managers should be concerned with building flexibility as a capability (Scott et al., 1988; De Leeuw & 
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Volberda, 1996), as it can lead to improved competitiveness (Sawnhey, 2006; Fantazy et al., 2009). 
“Firms increase their chances of success by having a range of options that enhance flexibility” 
(Fredericks, 2005, p. 563). Flexibility is defined as the ability to adapt, in the short-term, medium-
term and long-term, in response to known and unknown events, proactively or reactively and 
internally or externally (Golden & Powell, 2000). The term is used interchangeably with 
“responsiveness” and “agility” (De Leeuw & Volberda, 1996, p. 121). 
 
In the case of sales outsourcing, sales agents absorb considerable risk for their clients; in the US 
manufacturers’ representative model, the “rep” assumes all selling costs (Anderson & Trinkle, 2005). 
Brouthers et al. (2008) explain that real options would recommend an external solution whenever 
the outcome of an opportunity is particularly uncertain. A single sector qualitative study noted sales 
managers citing flexibility as a primary rationale for outsourcing sales (Rogers, 2009). Options are 
needed if flexibility is regarded as a strategic imperative.  
 
Williamson and Ghani (2012) noted that “real time responsiveness often trumps steady-state 
equilibrium considerations” (p. 78). Outsourcing or out-tasking some activities on some occasions 
are options that sales managers might use in pursuit of better control of limited resources in 
uncertain conditions. These cases can be contextualised in an exploratory study. Thus, it is proposed 
that: 
 
P4: The comparative speed and flexibility in deployment of resource options will be a primary factor 
in “make-or-buy “decisions in the sales function. 
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2.4 Moderators of resourcing decisions 
 
Models of make-or-buy propose a variety of moderating factors, which may be constructs drawn 
from TCE (Espino-Rodríguez, & Lai, 2014) or RBV (Tseng & Chen, 2013), institutional factors (Ang & 
Cummins, 1997; Graf & Mudambi, 2005) have also been proposed. Anderson et al. (2003) proposed 
several inhibitors to the outsourcing of sales activities. Three important themes were mentioned in 
this paper which linked to Anderson’s original work in 1985: perceptions of an imperfect supply 
market, perceptions of different competences in managing third parties and perceptions that sales 
outsourcing is not legitimate. Although common to all make-or-buy decisions, these factors require 
specific exploration in the sales context. 
 
A simple and obvious inhibitor to outsourcing is a manager’s perception of the availability of suitable 
contract sales organisations (Anderson, 1985). Lonsdale (1999) is quoted widely for advising that 
firms should not outsource into a limited supply market. Purchasing theory devotes considerable 
attention to calculating and minimising exposure to supply market constraints (Kraljic, 1983).  
 
In her seminal study in 1985, Anderson pointed out that the ability to manage manufacturers’ 
representatives may be a moderating factor in sales outsourcing activity. There is empirical support 
that the capability of managers to manage outsourcing is a moderating factor for a variety of 
outsourcing categories (Leiblein & Miller, 2003). There is also evidence that the ability to outsource 
delivers better performance from outsourcing (Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2002; Daugherty et al., 
2006), and that lack of it contributes to failure (Alexander & Young, 1996). Sales managers’ control 
competences are an important moderating factor in the successful implementation of strategy 
where salespeople are employed (Piercy et al., 2012). It seems logical that the same should be true 
with contractors or a mix of resources, and that investigating this potential moderating factor would 
be worthwhile. 
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Companies may modify their outsourcing behaviour to reflect “industry norms”, even though 
misalignment of activities and governance forms are likely to lead to lower profitability and failure 
(Macher & Richman, 2008). Uncertainty in the business environment seems to encourage imitation 
of perceived industry benchmarks (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Kock, 2005; Miranda & Kim, 2006). In 
the case of sales outsourcing, Weiss et al. (1999) found that perceptions of the relative reputational 
capital of their employer versus competitors was relevant to sales managers’ decisions about using 
manufacturers’ representatives. They would not outsource if they perceived that “best practice” 
companies did not outsource. Managers of functions at the customer interface must also be aware 
of evidence that insourcing appears to be correlated with better customer satisfaction (Graf et al., 
2013), and that outsourcing per se is viewed negatively (Lacity & Rudramuniyaiah, 2009). Research 
also provides evidence that agents can provide equal or better value to customers (Guenzi & Troilo, 
2007; Palmatier et al., 2007); they are a better option for accessing prospective customers (Chen et 
al., 2014); the agent has a reputation to consider as well (Mukherji & Ramachandran, 2007); and the 
customer does not necessary want direct contact with a manufacturer (Wuyts et al., 2004). 
Nevertheless, the reputational risk of outsourcing customer relationship handling is worthy of 
exploration.  
 
In summary, three major theories which are applied to organisational design, supplemented by 
earlier discussion of moderating factors, provide a comprehensive framework for an exploratory 
study of the relatively under-used phenomenon of outsourcing sales activities. Hence, concerning 
the moderators it is proposed that: 
 
P5: The availability of suitable suppliers will be a moderating factor in “make-or-buy” in the sales 
function. 
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P6: The ability to manage alternative resource options will be a moderating factor in “make-or-buy” 
in the sales function. 
P7: The perceived “legitimacy” of resourcing options will be a moderating factor in “make-or-buy” in 
the sales function. 
 
 
 
3. Method 
 
Anderson et al. (2003) posited that the “make or buy” decision in the sales function is one that is 
strongly influenced by the personal preferences and perceptual bias of the sales director, and that 
this topic would be an emotive one for sales managers. Therefore, it was the search for subjective 
views – specifically the perceptions that sales managers have about the factors that influence their 
resourcing choices and the benefits they would expect from them – that drove this research. Leading 
on from the theories examined, this was a study exploring optimal behaviours within the bounded 
rationality of the participants. Practical acts, accessed through narratives, reveal meaning and can 
increase understanding and identify patterns (Crist & Tanner, 2003). Anderson et al. (2003) observed 
that sales directors have “inordinate influence” (p. 1) and that the rest of the organisation accepts 
their recommendation on the structure of the sales function “without sufficient challenge” (p. 1).  
This is consistent with definitions of “elites” as people who exercise power and have influence 
(Woods, 1998; Undheim, 2003). The extant literature exploring the conduct of research with elite 
respondents suggests that gaining access is particularly challenging (Harvey, 2011; Goldman & 
Swayze, 2012; Nudzor, 2013). Consequently, the first challenge was recruiting suitable participants.  
 
The unit of analysis in the study is senior sales managers with responsibility for the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the sales function of their organisation, or part of it. In particular, the key sampling 
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criterion was to access senior sales managers who had several years’ experience of making 
resourcing decisions.  The Office of National Statistics recorded 142,000 full-time marketing and 
sales directors in August 2015. However, since only 0.5% of UK companies employ more than 250 
employees (ONS, 2010), the number of sales managers supervising substantial sales functions could 
be much smaller.  The aim was to achieve a sample that was purposeful (Hoepl, 1997; Baxter & 
Eyles, 1997) and achieved data saturation through number of words as well as number of 
respondents (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007). The sample was taken from senior sales managers with 
diverse profiles to ensure that multiple perspectives were captured. For the purpose of this study, it 
was considered as important to interview sales managers who did not outsource sales activities as 
well as those who did, as their responses could shed light on the inhibitors to outsourcing. This is 
consistent with “deviant case analysis” recommended by Seale & Silverman (1997) and Baxter & 
Eyles (1997). It was also considered desirable to select respondents from a variety of business-to-
business sectors, since most sales outsourcing studies have been single-sector.  
 
Respondents were accessed by networking methods including leveraging institutional affiliation 
(Institute of Sales and Marketing Management, Sales Leadership Alliance, alumni of MA Sales 
Management), leveraging the credentials of the researchers and using the personal connections of 
respondents (snowballing) (Welch et al., 2002). This gave the sample a bias towards thought-leaders 
in the profession. However, given the aim of the study to capture perceptions, it was considered 
advantageous to interview those who might be influencing their peers.  
 
Of 231 sales managers invited to participate, 34 volunteered to do so (15%). Carter et al., (2008) 
found that response rates in marketing and sales research dropped from 30% to 18% between 1990 
and 2005, with sales studies having an average of 15%. Therefore, this response rate appears to 
reflect the average for this topic area. 29 interviews were completed and analysed. Of these 29, all 
had experience of outsourcing some sales activities, although 28% were not outsourcing at the time 
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of interview. 34% were outsourcing selectively (up to 10% of activities) and 38% were regularly 
outsourcing. A cross-sectoral sample was achieved in order to enhance the richness of the data and 
the potential usefulness of the emerging themes. Most (24) were working for companies in the top 
ten in their sub-sector. All had more than 5 years’ experience in a senior sales management role and 
68% had more than 10 years’ experience. Although some had international responsibilities, all were 
UK nationals. 
 
A number of steps were taken to minimize bias in the collection of the data. Firstly, the questions 
were designed to reflect constructs derived from the literature review. The interview guide had four 
sections titled costs, control, skills and flexibility. Prompts for the moderating factors were 
integrated within the four sections. The interviewers were asked to rotate sections so that no 
particular section was affected by participants’ fatigue. An expert panel was consulted to check the 
interview guide. Participants were given access to the questions prior to interview, which has been 
recommended as a means of obtaining more in-depth data (Burke & Miller, 2001). A team of three 
third party interviewers were engaged to conduct the interviews, with a researcher occasionally on 
the call (with the consent of the participant) for quality control purposes. This step was designed to 
encourage consistency in adherence to the guide (Baxter & Eyles, 1997). Specific prompts for depth 
of feeling were designed into the guide. After the researcher had listened to the interviews, 
summaries were sent to the interviewees to check that their words had been interpreted fairly and 
to enable them to provide additional reflective comment. This verification step was designed to 
ensure the authenticity of the data (Lincoln & Guba, 1986; Seale & Silverman, 1997; Baxter & Eyles, 
1997).  
 
“Telephone interviews with elite and ultra-elite respondents are a valid and useful methodological 
tool that can provide important data for geographically-dispersed samples” (Stephens, 2007, p. 203).  
Given the evidence that telephone interviewing results in comparable quality data and has some 
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specific contextual advantages, especially for respondents with busy schedules, it was the medium 
chosen for the interviews (Novick, 2008; Glogowska et al., 2010; Trier-Bieniek, 2012). The duration 
of the telephone interviews was 45-75 minutes, which is acceptable for the medium (Wäppling et 
al., 2010; Harvey, 2011). Experienced telephone interviewers were used. They had been trained in 
the Code of Conduct of the Market Research Society. They had the ability to establish rapport 
quickly, detect auditory cues and respond to them (Hill et al., 2005; Novick, 2008).  
 
Filtering and familiarity questions were applied in the recruitment of respondents, to ensure they 
had relevant experience. Contextual questions such as firm characteristics and propensity to 
outsource were used to establish rapport. Open-ended questions were followed up by prompts or 
specific questions. Respondents were asked why they held and opinion, and how strongly (Gallup, 
1947). Care was taken to legitimise a “no opinion” response (De Vaus, 2002).  Open questions and 
prompts were linked to particular theories and prior research findings, but phrased in general 
business terminology. To ensure that the wording was appropriate, the questionnaire was adjusted 
after it had been reviewed by a panel including two sales managers, two sales trainers, two 
academics and a specialist interviewer (Foddy, 1993; De Vaus, 2002).  One additional adjustment 
was made after a pilot test of five interviews had been conducted.  
 
Authenticity is a key concern for qualitative research (Lincoln & Guba, 1986; Seale & Silverman, 
1997). Summary reports of each interviewee’s responses were sent to them to provide an 
opportunity to check that the researcher had understood their narrative and to provide reflective 
comment (Welch et al., 2002).  This contributed to the interpretive validity of the data, and was a 
conduit for post-research support from the researchers. Subsequent interim reports and invitations 
to discuss the modified model of resourcing decisions provided valuable verification for researcher 
and respondents.  Baxter & Eyles (1997) argue that this “member checking” is one of the most 
important strategies for enhancing validity.   
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The method of data analysis chosen was directed content analysis, a deductive approach in which 
theory precedes and guides analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). This was also consistent with the 
inclusion of open and closed questions within the discussions with participants. The process 
followed was familiarisation, condensing and coding, sorting into categories, identifying themes, 
mapping and interpreting and revision of theory (Pope et al, 2000).  
 
Following immersion in the raw data through listening to recordings and reading the transcripts, first 
level coding was undertaken. Initially themes derived from the literature review were used to 
identify codes. Text searches and word frequency queries were used to enhance manual coding and 
ensure all relevant data was captured wherever it occurred. Matrix and compound coding queries 
were used to explore patterns in the data. The use of Nvivo queries was important in minimizing the 
potential bias of the researcher which she acknowledged as favourable to outsourcing (Lewis, 2009). 
Regular consultations with an Nvivo trainer and a senior researcher were also undertaken.  Nvivo 
was also used to track coding decisions and concept-building, and ensure an audit trail from the data 
to the model (Bringer et al., 2004).   Over 150,000 words were analysed and 6,264 Nvivo references 
were identified.  Data saturation had been reached after 18 interviews as no new codes were 
generated thereafter.  
 
Care was taken to ensure that contexts per unit of text and its latent sense were analysed, and that 
text negating theory and non-textual signals were not overlooked (Lincoln & Guba, 1986; Frankel & 
Devers, 2000; Kohlbacher, 2006).  The coded units were sorted into categories and sub-categories, 
with some concepts requiring five levels of coding. Care was taken to ensure all data fitted into at 
least one category. “Creating categories is the core feature of qualitative content analysis.” 
(Graneheim & Lundman, 2003, p. 107). Categories were refined and reduced where possible. 
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Measures such as frequency of codes within categories were used to identify themes, which were 
used to map the scope of the findings and to model the patterns within them (Pope et al., 2000). 
 
4. Findings and discussion 
 
All respondents had made a variety of resourcing decisions over their careers, and had experience of 
outsourcing. There is much evidence in the sample of a pattern called “out-tasking” (Krishnamurthy 
et al., 2009), “granularity” (Watjatrakul & Drennan , 2005) or “chunkification” (Aron et al., 2005). 
Hybrid or partial arrangements are the norm, and it is activities perceived as tactical that are more 
likely to be outsourced (Novick, 2000). Some respondents were familiar with outsourcing a 
substantial proportion of sales activities and an interesting minority did outsource the management 
of key accounts in response to the challenge of accessing relevant skills. 
 
Six core themes emerged from discussions which were broadly consistent with extant literature, but 
depth of understanding was achieved concerning the positioning of the concepts as antecedents or 
moderating factors in resource decisions. 
  
4.1 The role of cost in sales resourcing decisions 
 
Pressures to reduce costs were mentioned by eight (28%) respondents as a key challenge, and 
eighteen (62%) reported frequent discussion of sales costs. This is consistent with Groth and 
Kinney’s (1994) assertions about the importance of cost control in company performance. 
Nevertheless, a significant minority (38%) of the respondents reported that they had the luxury of 
working in organisations where the cost of selling was not a major concern. Views on the importance 
of cost reduction were polarised. For six (21%) respondents, cost advantage was the key antecedent 
in sales resourcing decisions, and for a different six (21%) it was the least important consideration in 
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sales resourcing decisions. This was an indicator that the sales resourcing decision is probably more 
multi-faceted than in many other functions in the firm.  
 
Insert table 1 about here 
 
Kakabadse & Kakabadse (2002) and Kremic et al. (2006) noted that cost reduction is the main 
benefit sought from outsourcing. In this sample, the opinion that more outsourcing decreased costs 
and that less outsourcing decreased costs were both observed.  This seems to have resonance with 
the findings of Mpoyi & Bullington (2004) who found that changing the degree of vertical integration 
of a company seemed to improve productivity, but it was unclear whether more or less vertical 
integration was better. Each company’s context can be different. 
 
The sales managers of two cost leader firms reported relatively high levels of outsourcing in their 
sales function, consistent with the findings of Martinez-Sánchez et al. (2007) that cost leaders have a 
higher outsourcing intensity and Jiang et al. (2006) that firms who make extensive use of outsourcing 
have a significant cost advantage. (E.g. “To keep costs off our balance sheet, and head count off our 
balance sheet, we've always employed external agencies.” R26).  
 
Ross et al. (2005) claimed that imperfect information about resource costs will lead to flawed 
decisions in favour of in-house. There was evidence in this study that lack of information was a 
problem. Only eight (28%) respondents felt that they had enough information on which to make cost 
comparisons. Twenty (69%) respondents said that they did not have enough information on which to 
base a cost comparison of employees versus contract sales organisations. Of those who were 
positive that they had enough information on which to compare the costs of different resourcing 
options, half were using contract sales organisations extensively but not all of them perceived 
contractors to be cheaper. Firms who have developed competences in managing third parties seem 
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to have fewer problems with monitoring costs (consistent with the findings of Lieblein & Miller, 
2003). 
 
Although contexts vary, there is a clear indication that cost is a core element in the any decision-
making model for the sales function, and proposition 1 was supported by the data. The lack of 
costing information about sales outsourcing options warrants further research. Hence we propose 
the following for future research: 
 
P1: Comparative cost of resource options will be a primary factor in “make-or-buy” decisions in the 
sales function. 
 
4.2 The role of skills in resourcing decisions 
 
“There’s no shortage of supply; it’s quality that’s the problem.” (R7). 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Availability of skills was the most frequently quoted challenge respondents faced. Perceptions of a 
“skills gap” were evident.  19 (66%) respondents commented on the impact of sales skills (or lack of 
them) on the business. As one respondent explained: “Skills and aptitude, it’s what I’m looking for 
first, because that’s got the highest impact on our reputation.” (R7). One commented: “The practice 
of hiring senior sales people or indeed any salesperson, is not something that is easy” (R6); similarly: 
“If you need to change and build a skill set, that’s going to take probably a year or two” (R27). As 
Ansoff (1987) noted, there is a time lag in developing new skills internally. 
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52% of the respondents regarded skills as the priority in making resourcing decisions. They appeared 
to make competency-based judgements about which sales activities to outsource:  “Where we have 
got an internal skill gap” (R27); “Where we identify areas where we don’t have the skill set 
internally” (R20). Where companies are outsourcing sales activities, it is usually those activities are 
perceived to require tactical selling skills. For example in healthcare, where detailing new treatments 
to General Practitioners is outsourced frequently, while relationship-building with large decision-
making units in hospital trusts is usually insourced (Rogers, 2008). 
 
Consistent with Hamel & Prahalad (1994) and Holcomb & Hitt (2007), it was apparent that 
outsourcing was a means of acquiring skills that would be difficult to develop internally, or it could 
be used to create a mix of internal and external skills that would be beneficially dynamic. Noticeably, 
respondents who felt that they were better than competitors on revenue growth or winning new 
customers appeared to be using higher levels of outsourcing.  
 
Although it has been observed that just having a directly employed sales force does not create 
superior value (Guenzi & Troilo, 2007), 24 (83%) respondents felt that employees were more skilled 
than contractors. This was the case in some instances where respondents had substantial experience 
of both, and data to compare. This suggests that respondents tended to agree that if a resource is 
firm-specific or unique, in-house gives better results (Espino-Rodríguez & Padrón-Robaina, 2006; 
Geyskens et al., 2006).  
 
Customer knowledge, leading to the development of strong relationships with customers, was 
considered most important for employed and contracted salespeople, but formal training about 
customers was limited.  Respondents perceived that selling has become more complex, with 
“solutions” being required more than products (a trend identified in the key account literature, e.g. 
Ryals & Holt, 2007).   One respondent explained: “ten years ago, people would go out and buy a 
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simple box to do a test. Now they are looking for solutions to improve the process” (R9). The topic of 
skills evoked some strong statements from respondents, such as: “Essentially it is the promotion of 
our added value proposition and I feel very strongly about it” (R21); “If you haven’t got the right 
person, and you haven’t got the right skills, then the rest of it is irrelevant, and all your costs will go 
through the roof and you wouldn’t end up getting what you were wanting (strongly felt)” (R29).   
 
Despite the general strength of feeling about the value-adding capabilities of employed staff, three 
instances of outsourcing “core” sales activities, such as key account management, were observed: 
“There are some things where we just intellectually even don’t have the capability internally (which 
is not a skill that we have within our employee base) so that would sometimes go out...to the 
agency” (R27). Access to external talent can overcome internal constraints to growth (Kor & 
Mahoney, 2004). These exceptions reinforced the need for deeper exploration of the availability of 
skills in the contracting or recruitment market. 
 
Perceived skills deficiencies in contractors were often given as a reason for not outsourcing a 
particular activity. Some respondents felt that employed salespeople usually get more training and 
development, so they would be expected to have better skills: “I do feel quite strongly that they are 
much more competent because of the level of investment I make in them” (R7); “The clinical 
knowledge or the technical knowledge of the in-house guys, it probably tends to be greater... a 
product of the fact that the in-house guys have probably had a longer, more in-depth training 
programme” (R25). Sales outsourcing studies (Anderson, 1985; Wilson & Zhang, 2002 and Krafft et 
al., 2004) all found that where a high level of training is needed, sales would be insourced, and 
respondents in this study tended to follow that trend. 
 
The desire for salespeople immersed in the company culture and with specific technical knowledge 
is not surprising in most business-to-business sectors. Nevertheless, respondents seemed to be 
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impressed with the core selling skills of contract sales organisations and were combining contractors 
and employees in the sales process with a view to getting the best productivity. 
 
Overall, it seems that most respondents took a resource-based view approach to “make-or-buy”, but 
at a granular level; they were looking at skills per customer segment or process step. There was 
sufficient breadth and depth of feeling on the topic to support the proposition that comparative 
skills are a primary consideration in a sales resourcing model.  Hence, we propose the following for  
future research: 
 
P2: The comparative skill level of resource options will be a primary factor in “make-or-buy” decisions 
in the sales function. 
 
4.3 The role of flexibility and choice in sales resourcing decisions 
 
Although not always a priority, the issue of resource flexibility was frequently mentioned by 
respondents. There were a number of references to the need to change resourcing models, 
consistent with assumptions made in the literature that changing resource patterns to respond to 
environmental change is the most important role of strategy (Snow et al., 2005;  Shimizu & Hitt, 
2004).  
 
Insert table 3 about here 
 
Some respondents were turning to contractors to help with short-term surges in demand, consistent 
with literature suggesting that volume flexibility positively affects a firm’s competiveness (Jack & 
Raturi, 2002; Sawhney, 2006), and specifically the view that resourcing options help to build a firm’s 
capabilities (Foss, 1998).  
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Insert table 4 about here 
 
The need to “flex” sales resources as market conditions change is a classic strategic challenge 
(Shimizu & Hitt, 2004). 72% of respondents were partially outsourcing, and there were some 
indications that respondents were using “real options” to be responsive to market conditions and to 
improve competiveness (Sanchez, 1993; Golden & Powell, 2000; Alvarez & Stenbacka, 2007).  
 
Twelve respondents defended employed salespeople’s ability to adapt and to improve their 
productivity. They apparently agreed with Coase (1937) that employees are the most adaptable 
organisational form. Some mentioned that crisis conditions in the economy had been instrumental. 
Examples given were office moves and accepting pay cuts. Like others in the labour market, 
salespeople adjusted to the fall in output in 2008 and 2009 through slower (or negative) earnings 
growth (ONS 2010/11).  
 
For others, contractors had a role. Fourteen (48%) respondents focused on the contribution that 
they can make to achieving rapid change.  
 
Insert table 5 about here 
 
Getting something done quickly seems to be a frequent antecedent for the use of carefully pre-
selected contract sales organisations. Most respondents had experienced short-term contracting out 
of particular tasks. Difficulties in acquiring resources to address new opportunities might be a strong 
incentive to using a third party/contractor. Choice of resourcing options, as advocated in real 
options theory, can maximize opportunity (Sanchez, 1993; Foss, 1998; Anderson, 2000; Sharma & 
Mehotra, 2007). A few respondents also commented on the ability of third parties to help minimise 
24 
 
their financial risk in tough economic times. They mentioned similar sacrifices to those offered by 
employed staff. These comments are consistent with observations that financial risk can be shifted 
to contractors (Anderson & Trinkle, 2005).  This is a key benefit predicted by real options theory - the 
risk of addressing an opportunity is minimised by a resourcing choice that enables commitment can 
be postponed (Anderson, 2000). 
 
Prioritising flexibility in supplier choice has been observed to have a favourable impact on 
performance (González-Benito, 2010). Both outsourcing of non-core tasks and internal flexibility are 
associated with better performance (Martinez-Sánchez et al., 2007). Similarly, respondents seem to 
have coaxed flexibility from employed salespeople and built more flexibility into their resourcing 
model with tactical use of contract sales organisations.  Irrespective of whether employees or 
contractors are expected to provide it, flexibility appears to have a primary role in a sales resourcing 
model. Nevertheless, for future research we propose that: 
 
P3: The comparative speed and flexibility in deployment of resource options will be a primary factor 
in “make-or-buy “decisions in the sales function. 
 
4.4 The role of control in sales resourcing decisions 
 
In the case of studies of sales outsourcing (Anderson, 1985; Krafft et al., 2004), there is an indication 
that work that is easily measured, i.e. measured by short-term outputs, is most suitable for 
outsourcing.  Respondents mentioned a number of measurements such as call rates, appointments 
made, conversion rates, sales volume and gross margin. One respondent mentioned key 
performance indicators which encompassed outcomes and behaviours, but most users focused on 
outcomes, which are easier to measure. Respondents who made extensive use of contractors 
perceived contract performance as a fairly easy mechanism.  
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“We contract for a certain level of performance and they have to deliver it.” R8 
“We always have in an allotted timescale with a clear objective, whereas sometimes within a 
(internal) sales function, I don’t believe objectives are, well, set correctly.” R15 
“I have....us(ed) an outside sales source, for a very short time, but only on the basis that we get a 
strict return on investment.” R17 
“The contract sales people, I have to say they are generally focussed on activity, hitting the 
numbers.” R2 
 
These comments are consistent with the view that relationships with contractors have to be highly 
structured to be successful (Barthélemy & Quélin, 2006; Daugherty et al., 2006).  
 
Overall, sales managers perceived employed salespeople to be easier to control. The nature of the 
written contract was not necessarily the main issue for sales managers in resource deployment. The 
“psychological contract” (Schein, 1979) observed between employees and their employers may be 
very relevant in the sales function, although more has been written about the salesperson’s trust in 
the manager (e.g. Flaherty & Pappas, 2000) than the sales manager’s pride in his/her ability to lead 
and motivate their team. “I have always seen my role as a sales leader to be deployed as a coach” 
(R6). Another explained: “Looking to improve people’s performance and develop them as 
individuals...that’s very key to managing an employed sales force” (R10). 
 
In general, respondents were confident about their success with customers, regardless of 
outsourcing pattern. Outsourcers had confidence in their control mechanisms, as expected by 
studies of relational governance (Mohr & Spekman, 1996; Judge & Dooley, 2006). Nevertheless, 
some respondents perceived very specific moral hazards for companies using third parties to work 
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with their customers and five respondents gave specific examples of contractors’ staff failing to 
observe ethical codes.   
 
The discussion of reputational risk seemed to be strongly linked and associated with the preference 
for behavioural control. Respondents wished to avoid the contractual hazards (Mayer & Salomon, 
2006) and vulnerability (Mantel et al., 2006) predicted by transaction cost economics (Williamson, 
1975). For example, “in the first place they might give you the best people to work on a particular 
project, but over time…sometimes the quality can be dropped off” (R19).  
 
Ford et al. (1993) noted that “loss of control” (p. 211) was the main dis-benefit of buying-in 
resources rather than employing salespeople, even where cost calculation suggested that 
outsourcing was desirable. The desire for control clearly plays a role in resourcing decisions. While 
not expecting respondents to volunteer their own ego or empire-building as reasons for insourcing, 
if a power angle was relevant, it might have been expected to emerge. Enjoyment of the role of 
coach is evident. However, when respondents were prompted to comment on the degree to which 
control issues had any impact on their sourcing behaviour, the answers were generally neutral (only 
one respondent described it as a priority in sales resourcing). Many perceived that 
controlling/motivating internal teams was not necessarily any easier. The benefit of exploring the 
concept with respondents was identification that reputational risk seems to be playing an 
instrumental role in a desire for control. It may be perceived to be the principle at the core of the 
importance of control in “make-or-buy” decisions about the sales function. Therefore the initial 
proposition about the role of control was amended and we propose the following for future 
research: 
 
P4: The degree of reputational risk perceived by the sales manager will be a moderating factor in 
resourcing decisions in the sales function 
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4.5 The role of the supply market in sales resourcing decisions 
 
Anderson (1985) suggested that some sales outsourcing decisions were influenced by the availability 
of suitable manufacturers’ representatives.  Respondents were prompted to comment on how easy 
it was to find contractors, and also how many companies they could name. Most respondents 
commented favourably about the availability of contract sales suppliers or similar options. There was 
some contextual detail worth noting, such as two commenting that quantity was not a problem, but 
quality of supply was a problem. Both the availability of suppliers (Ventovuori, 2006) and quality of 
suppliers (Espíno-Rodriguez & Padrón-Robaina, 2004) is relevant to propensity to outsource. 
 
Although an increase in number of contract organisations was noted, the nature of supply is still 
considered flawed in most sectors, as most suppliers are very small and do not have the scope to 
help larger firms. However, there were a few very positive comments about available contractors, 
and the majority of respondents seemed to suggest that the availability of contractors was at least 
as good if not better than the availability of candidates for permanent positions. The recruitment 
market was also considered to be flawed. Sixteen (55%) respondents mentioned difficulties finding 
candidates for permanent positions. “It’s been more difficult to get the right calibre of 
salesperson...than I have ever experienced before. It’s been high volume in the market place, but 
low quality” (R7). Reasons for difficulty varied, including geographical constraints (the size of the job 
market in particular localities), the quality of candidates available, the constraint of needing 
industry-specific knowledge and the pay expectations of candidates.  
 
Regardless of market conditions, eleven (38%) respondents commented about the amount of 
management effort involved in recruitment. Typical comments included: “There’s a lot of my time 
and management team’s time goes into making sure we’re getting the right people” (R7); “I think 
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matching and recruiting current staff is extremely time consuming” (R12); “You've got to go through 
a much more detailed interview process, selection process” (R22); “Recruiting is hard work and very 
time intensive” (R27).  
 
Availability of suitable sales staff may not be particularly better than access to suitable contractors. 
Arguably, there is just a poor market for sales skills (CFA, 2012). Insourcing from a limited supply 
market (quality and quantity) may be just as problematic as outsourcing into a limited supply 
market. The need to acquire skills may be an antecedent of a make-or-buy decision in the sales 
function, but the availability of skills is a moderating factor, as either or both the contract sales 
supply market and the recruitment market may be flawed. Hence, for future research, it is proposed 
that: 
 
P5: The availability of suitable contractors and/or job candidates will be a moderating factor in 
resourcing in the sales function 
 
4.6 The role of managerial skills in sales resourcing 
 
Guenzi and Troilo (2007) found that the quality of sales management was more important than the 
type of sales force in delivering customer value. Motivating salespeople was often cited by 
respondents as a key challenge; “Maintaining the morale and keeping people motivated... was the 
most difficult part” (R1); “Internal sales people are much more difficult to manage and motivate” 
(R8) and “We have struggled with getting the buy-in” (R20). One respondent noted the frustration of 
motivation when external factors are difficult: “Fluctuations in demand ... really caused me my 
greatest problems around motivation, morale and changes” (R28).  
 
Nevertheless, the amount of time spent in monitoring behaviour and performance of employed 
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salespeople, and improving it through coaching and development, are not trivial. Just as companies 
do not often have accurate measures of the real transaction costs of dealing with third parties, 
Anderson (1985) argued that the hidden costs of internal operations are difficult to measure. As 
noted above, most respondents commented on enjoying their role as developers of salespeople, but 
sales managers have to work very hard with salespeople to establish trust (McNeilly & Lawson, 1999; 
Choi et al., 2004). 
 
Managing third party sales channels is a specific skill, different from managing employed salespeople 
and different from standard supplier management that could be handled by the purchasing function 
(Magrath & Hardy, 1987; Novick, 2000; McQuiston, 2001).  A lack of capability is likely to lead to 
problems (Alexander & Young, 1996; Cox et al., 2004; Ngwenyama & Sullivan, 2007).  Respondents 
recognised that managing third parties was a different and difficult skill set (Fan, 2000).  Consistent 
with Handley and Benton’s (2009) findings, where good relationship management had been 
achieved, there was support for contract sales organisations reducing transaction costs and risks, 
such as saving time for sales managers: “If you’ve got good partners externally and they run a tight 
ship, it can be very easy; it can be a very smooth process” (R26) and “We currently work with around 
a hundred different (third parties) across the country, and we couldn’t manage a hundred sales 
people” (R10).  
 
This study supports the view that different types of sales force require different management 
competences. From a theoretical point of view, the characteristics of good relational management 
outlined by Mayo et al. (1998), including appropriate rewards, training, and information exchange, 
do not seem so different from the characteristics of good management of salespeople. However, the 
difference between working with individuals, and working with other firms, mattered to many 
respondents. 
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Experience of managing third parties and success are linked (Díez-Vial, 2007). One respondent 
commented: “When I first came into management I felt it was very difficult to control contract 
organisations, but having more experience it’s just as easy really” (R2). Others expressed 
reservations: “You have to have a lot of patience dealing with a third party.... more than you do with 
your own people” (R4). 
 
P6:  The ability to manage alternative resource options will be a moderating factor in resourcing 
decisions in the sales function 
 
4.7 Summary 
 
The discussion of sales managers’ priorities when making resourcing decisions has created insight 
into reasons that prompt resource choices and factors which modify choices. Access to skills was the 
dominant antecedent, followed by cost and flexibility.  
 
Control was not a priority, which was the first indication that it might be playing a different role in 
the resource decision-making process.  The concern with behavioural control noted in the literature 
suggests that the desire to control sales resources, whether employees or contractors, is prompted 
by something more than observance of contract terms. Where reputable contract sales 
organisations have been managed well, it appears that contract terms have been met. It is 
qualitative aspects of performance that are the most difficult to measure. Respondents were 
prompted to talk specifically about ethical behaviour. In a separate section, respondents were 
prompted to discuss their attitudes to industry norms and their reputation with customers, and a 
link between the two themes emerged. It is therefore proposed that the degree of behavioural 
control required, which might be measured by perceptions of reputational risk, is a primary 
moderating factor in the “make-or-buy” decision.  
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Other moderating factors emerging from the literature were also important. Both the ability to 
manage outsourcing, which seemed to be associated with expectations of good performance from 
outsourcing, and perceptions about the supply market for both contract sales organisations and 
direct recruits, were relevant to respondents.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Fig 1 Model of resource decision-making 
 
This model is the end result of this research study. It contributes to the understanding of outsourcing 
by providing a model of the connections between constructs previously associated only with one 
approach, or not tested. By exploring in depth the perceptions of sales managers about their 
resourcing choices brings rich linguistic data to bear on the “make-or-buy” question. As 
recommended by Busi and McIvor (2008), theories have been compared and combined to explore 
the full extent of resource decisions in the sales function. Twelve respondents who remained 
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engaged with three stages of verification confirmed it reflected their practice, with three 
commenting on the importance of the role of reputational risk.  On the basis of Wood and Welch’s 
(2010) continuum of research findings, it can be argued that this is a conceptual framework that 
reflects the state “something has happened” (in the experience of senior sales managers), which is 
worthy of discussion and provides a platform for further research.   
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This research has elaborated a conceptual model for understanding the antecedents and moderating 
factors that influence how sales managers’ perceive sales resourcing decisions. Previous studies have 
examined “all or nothing” sales outsourcing in limited contexts from a particular theoretical lens. 
This study has examined all possible instances of outsourcing within the sales function from a variety 
of theoretical angles, while accommodating respondents’ own world-view. Its breadth allowed for 
more than one antecedent of any particular outsourcing decision to be the driver of the conceptual 
model, and the role of potential moderating factors has been explored.  
 
The need to reduce costs, acquire skills or improve flexibility were primary considerations in 
resourcing decisions, but any choice prompted by cost, skill or flexibility comparison would be 
modified by the degree of reputational risk which drives the type of control required. Any 
preference at this stage would be modified further by the state of the supply market and the skills 
available to manage the resourcing choice. An interesting example to work through the model was 
the case of a niche player in a professional services market with a growth opportunity, where a high 
level of relationship management skills were required and reputational risk was high. This indicated 
a preference for employment, but the recruitment market was not working for the sales manager so 
a third party option was tried and was successful. The contractors were later taken on as employees. 
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It is worthy of note that the three factors “top of mind” across the sample of sales managers when 
making resourcing decisions were cost, skills and flexibility, consistent with Hätönen and Eriksson 
(2009) whose  review of 30 years of the outsourcing literature concluded that cost-saving, capability 
enhancement and gaining flexibility were the “three main motives for outsourcing” (p146). 
However, we should note that sales managers’ opinions were divided on whether or not their 
outsourcing options were cheaper, better skilled or more flexible than employees. Cost leaders were 
able to realise cost benefits from outsourcing, sales managers with experience of managing third 
parties were able to utilize the specific skills of third parties and/or leverage them for flexibility. 
There is a “chicken and egg” situation, which is why “resource management ability” is identified as a 
moderating factor. Arguably sales managers need to be encouraged to acquire more training and 
experience in managing third parties as part of their resource portfolio if companies are to improve 
the agility of their sales models.  They would also need to be able to compare the supply market for 
third parties with the recruitment market for salespeople. Both have their challenges but it was clear 
that recruitment was not an easy or time-effective option. Lack of information was a frequent 
complaint, suggesting that more support from the purchasing and HR function could be useful. 
 
Transaction cost theory has been described as “the prominent ideas behind outsourcing” (Hätönen 
and Eriksson, 2009, p142) and much of the literature in this field focuses on the hidden costs of 
managing external contracts which would inhibit outsourcing to the market and prompt a 
preference for internal behavioural control. Williamson and Ghani (2012) commented that these 
costs may be a subsequent consideration. In the case of customer-facing function such as sales, 
where third parties need to be arm’s length brand ambassadors, sales managers’ nervousness about 
reputational risk was expressed quite strongly, and generated additional comment in the verification 
stages. To conceptualize a perceived need for control and avoidance of the hidden costs of managing 
third parties to adapt to customers’ needs, “reputational risk” seemed to have resonance with the 
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respondents. This also seemed to be considered earlier in their thinking than the practicalities of the 
supply market or how to manage third parties.  As with all risks, it can be managed. 
 
 
Deconstructing transaction costs in the sales context does not contradict the expectations of 
transaction cost economics, but reinforces the need to consider the hidden costs of insourcing or 
outsourcing. It was worthwhile adding resource-based view concepts into discussions, especially as 
52% of respondents thought that access to superior skills was the dominant factor in resourcing 
decisions. The overlapping TCE construct of asset specificity is more helpful in explaining why sales 
managers split skills into categories, with the most transferable (core selling skills) being the more 
likely domain for outsourcing. However, TCE is much less helpful in explaining the apparent 
preference for outsourcing in the context of realising opportunities in uncertain environments. 69% 
perceived that commercial contracts were easier to change. Including real options as a theoretical 
lens to guide discussion was helpful, as the assumptions of TCE that employees are more flexible 
does not necessarily seem to fit with modern employment law in a European Union country. 
 
In summary, this article contributes to the outsourcing literature by exploring the phenomenon in 
the sales function in a qualitative study observing the subjective cause and effect of senior sales 
managers. There is consistency with outsourcing models in other functions, in that TCE and RBV 
seemed to have predictive value, but this model is focused on the sales function in particular, with 
its customer-facing role and granular approach to outsourcing.  
 
6. Limitations 
 
This research has a number of limitations common to qualitative studies. The structuring of the 
sample was limited by the difficulty of accessing a very busy managerial elite. It has achieved 
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richness and depth in linguistic data, and offers unique insights into the way the sales resourcing 
decisions are perceived. The focus of this study has been to conceptualise a model of resourcing 
decisions in the sales function. Given the small sample, it is not generalizable, but may be 
transferable. Within the time frame available, data absorption was reached and a large amount of 
comment was gathered. There were a number of sources of potential bias, in the sample, in the data 
gathering process and in the data analysis process. The steps taken to minimize bias have been 
discussed. 
 
The pursuit of rationale may have been a limitation, given the power that sales managers appear to 
have when designing their sales departments. There may be internal political factors (McIvor, 2009), 
or ego factors such as empire-building (Chen et al, 2008) which also moderate sales outsourcing. 
These may be more clearly perceived by managers on the receiving end of sales manager’s 
recommendations than by the sales managers themselves. Therefore qualitative studies of 
perceptions of sales outsourcing with financial or purchasing managers as respondents may make an 
interesting contribution to this field. 
 
All the respondents in this study were senior sales managers based in the UK, although many of 
them had pan-European or global experience and references were made to other countries. It would 
be expected that senior people in large companies have international experience, but nevertheless, 
it must be acknowledged that all respondents came from a single national culture and therefore 
some national bias may affect these findings. 
 
7. Further research 
 
Besides quantitative testing of the conceptual framework, some nuances of sales management 
emerged from this research meriting further exploratory study. 
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The study established that the skills required to manage through third parties differ from the skills 
needed to coach employees to better performance. However, most respondents felt that they were 
not well-equipped to discuss the skills of managing third parties, other than references to 
compliance control. Case studies of the management of third parties in the sales function, including 
scenarios where third party effort has to be integrated with that of employees (such as employees of 
value-added resellers working on key account teams, or contractors providing desk-based support to 
key account teams) would be a useful contribution to knowledge.  
 
Also, it was not the intention of this study to examine the relationship between a sales manager and 
their reporting staff. However, it was clear from some respondents that there is a strong bond 
between sales managers and salespeople. They enjoy their role as leader and coach, and the 
coaching of employees to achieve higher levels of performance is part of their identity as a sales 
manager. It seems that the majority of the leader-member exchange studies focus on the way that 
employees perceive their managers. In the sales function, there seems to be a rich source of 
knowledge to be tapped about how managers perceive their responsibilities to their reporting staff.  
 
If true flexibility is to be achieved in sale resourcing, opportunity realisation will often involve 
transition from one resourcing option to another. Changes need to be prompt and objective, but 
respondents have observed both employee resistance to change and contractor opportunism. 
Providing the right foundation for changing resourcing models must be important to sales managers. 
Case study research seems to be the appropriate method for examining these phenomena. 
 
Finally, it was reported by many participants that the information available to them in making 
resourcing decisions was inadequate. Comparisons of the richness of information available for make-
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or-buy decisions in different functions, such as production, logistics, IT and sales, could produce 
interesting insights. 
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